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Abstract: The theory of competitive balance represents one of the core concepts of 
sports economics. Based upon an international research project analyzing the per-
ception of competitive balance by consumers (Pawlowski 2013a, 2013b; Pawlowski 
& Budzinski 2013, 2014), we argue in this paper that behavioural explanations of 
competitive balance may offer additional insights for selected sports economics 
and, in particular, sports policy problems, complementing the standard view on 
competitive balance. After summarizing the standard analysis of competitive bal-
ance in sports economics concerning theory, policy and empirical record in chapter 
2, we report the main theoretical and empirical insights from our research project 
(chapter 3, closely drawing on the respective publications). In addition to providing 
a more comprehensive picture of the behavioural economics of competitive bal-
ance, we add a discussion of sports policy implications (chapter 4). While perceived 
competitive balance is found to matter, there are rather narrow conditions for 
sports policy interventions or restrictive regulations of competition by the league 
management (or sports associations). Furthermore, it is not the balance of the 
overall league that matters. Instead, it is sufficient or even advantageous if the 
most relevant subcompetitions, like the race for the championship or the fight 
against relegation, are ‘balanced’ among a narrow oligopoly of contenders.   
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1. Introduction 
Ever since the seminal pioneering work of Rottenberg (1956), competitive balance 
has been viewed as a major element of sports economics and largely responsible 
for economic success of professional sports business. The standard notion of com-
petitive balance typically relates to the overall balance of a sports league or cham-
pionship, i.e. the competitive closeness of all participants in the contest. Conse-
quently, the empirical branch of sports economics has predominantly employed 
league-global or championship-global measures in order to estimate competitive 
balance in its effects. In line with the research focus of sports economics, competi-
tive balance issues and reasoning have been a major driving-force of sports policy 
interventions and regulations. 
Based upon an international research project analyzing the perception of competi-
tive balance by consumers (Pawlowski 2013a, 2013b; Pawlowski & Budzinski 2013, 
2014), we argue in this paper that behavioural explanations of competitive balance 
may offer additional insights and a more appropriate approach for selected sports 
economics and, in particular, sports policy problems. While we find that perceived 
competitive balance does matter, we also conclude rather narrow conditions for 
sports policy interventions or restrictive regulations of competition by the league 
management (or sports associations). Moreover, it is not the balance of the overall 
league that influences fans’ behaviour. Instead, it is sufficient – or even advanta-
geous in the eyes of the fans – if the most relevant subcompetitions, like the race 
for the championship or the fight against relegation, are ‘balanced’ among a nar-
row oligopoly of contenders. After summarizing the standard analysis of competi-
tive balance in sports economics in the dimensions theory, policy and empirical 
record in chapter 2, we report the main theoretical and empirical insights from our 
research project (chapter 3, closely drawing on the respective publications). Next to 
providing a more comprehensive picture of the behavioural economics of competi-
tive balance, we add a discussion of sports policy implications (chapter 4). 
2. The Uncertainty-of-Outcome Hypothesis and Competitive Balance 
2.1 Standard Theory of Competitive Balance 
The concepts of the uncertainty-of-outcome hypothesis (UOH) and competitive bal-
ance have been highlighted as distinctive features of the economics of sports from 
the beginnings of sports economics research, pioneered by Rottenberg (1956) and 
Neale (1964), on. The UOH describes an important motive why consumers find at-
tending or watching sports events exciting and entertaining. Next to the absolute 
quality of the product – the level of talent, extraordinary skills or athletic prowess – 
it is the relative quality of the competition among sports teams or athletes that 
creates entertainment value for the spectators. This relative quality manifests itself 
2 
 
 
 
in the unpredictability of the competition results: the uncertainty of outcome. If 
spectators knew in advance how a sporting competition would play out and end, 
the utility gained from consuming this product would be rather low. For instance, 
re-runs of past seasons of premier league football1 (or other team sports) attract a 
tiny fraction of the viewers of live broadcasts or other first-time broadcasts (sum-
mary programs, time-delayed broadcasts) of new games. The hypothesis in sports 
economics, thus, has always been that the uncertainty of outcome critically influ-
ences the (marginal) utility for consumers and, consequently, drives the willingness-
to-pay for attending or watching sports events. Accordingly, an increasing uncer-
tainty of outcome increases (marginal) utility and, therefore, at any given price, in-
creases demand (D) (for tickets/stadium attendance or broadcasts) – and revenues 
(R) for the suppliers of the sports product (clubs, leagues, athletes, etc.). This is the 
fundamental content of the UOH. 
Because the UOH plays such a central role for the business of sports, the question 
arises what are the driving-forces of outcome uncertainty. Again, rooted in the pio-
neering works of sports economics (Rottenberg 1956; Neale 1964), the standard 
reasoning emphasizes the role of the closeness of competitiveness among the 
competitors. The degree of outcome uncertainty depends on degree of disparity 
between the competitors: the bigger the performance gap between ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ teams, the higher is competitive imbalance. Or, the other way around, if the 
competitors in a league or championship are of equal strength, then competitive 
balance is at its maximum. Theoretically, perfect competitive balance in a football 
league implies that each team enjoys the same probability to win in respect to each 
game. Thus, the notion of competitive balance (CB) refers to the balance of com-
petitiveness among the participants of a sports contest. Combining the concepts of 
UOH and CB yields that high competitive balance is in the economic interest of all 
participants of a sporting contest since: CB↑  UO↑  D↑  R↑.  
This insight is of palmary importance for sports economics and sports policy be-
cause it defines a distinctive difference between sports markets and ordinary mar-
kets: whereas in ordinary markets each competitor has an unambiguous interest to 
become the market leader also at the expense of other competitors (and even by 
deterring the competitive fringe by establishing a monopoly), competitors in sports 
markets are in need of each other in order to provide an economically viable prod-
uct. Moreover, they do not only need to allow their competitors to survive, they 
also have an individual as well as a common incentive to preserve the competitive-
ness of their competitors.2 In the words of Rottenberg (1956: 242, 246): „The na-
1 If not specifically emphasized otherwise, the term “football” refers to European-style football 
(sometimes also called soccer) throughout this paper. 
2 It should be emphasized that it is in the economic interest of each participant to preserve the 
competitiveness of the others – but not in the sportive interest (the desire to win). 
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ture of the industry is such that competitors must be of approximately equal "size" 
if any are to be successful; this seems to be a unique at-tribute of professional 
competitive sports. (…) That is to say, the "tighter" the competition, the larger the 
attendance”. “‘Oh Lord, make us good, but not that good,’ must be the prayer” 
(Neale 1964: 2). 
Along the lines of this pioneering reasoning, economic models have been devel-
oped starting with the seminal work of El-Hodiri & Quirk (1971). Fundamentally, 
they model professional sports leagues with two profit maximizing teams and fixed 
talent supply (for extensions and modifications see Fort & Quirk 1995 and Vrooman 
1995). They compare the noncooperative equilibrium (the competition case) with 
the cooperative equilibrium (the cartel or monopoly case). If the marginal revenue 
functions of the two teams differ with one representing a big-market team and the 
other one a small-market team, then competitive balance in the cooperative equi-
librium is (under some additional conditions and assumptions) higher than in the 
noncooperative equilibrium. Since more competitive balance, however, is welfare-
maximizing, regulatory interventions to increase competitive balance may be justi-
fied in the case of differing financial strengths of the teams. Thus, theory adds the 
important insight that differences in the financial potential of the teams lead to 
competitive imbalance, providing the theoretical fundament for equalizing policy 
interventions (financial level-playing field).  
However, some authors have extended this modeling framework in a way that casts 
doubt on some of the central results (Szymanski & Késenne 2004; Szymanski 
2006a). By emphasizing the magnitude of marginal revenue changes due to addi-
tional wins, they conclude that a noncooperative Nash-equilibrium of the modified 
sports league model includes more competitive balance than the cooperative equi-
librium and the social optimum because allocating additional wins to the team 
with the higher marginal revenue (the big-market team) increases total profits. 
Thus, (some) imbalance is profit-maximizing. 
The reasoning that consumers may actually prefer (some) imbalance is further rein-
forced by considerations of absolute quality. The economic theory of superstars 
and stardom emphasizes the preference of consumers to witness the best: second-
best talent can be a poor substitute for first-best talent (Rosen 1981), known talent 
qualities may be preferred to unknown new talent (MacDonald 1988), and positive 
network externalities including boulevard externalities may increase the consump-
tion utility if superstar teams or athletes are present (Adler 1985; Franck & Nüesch 
2007). Superstars – by their very definition – create imbalance, still superstar phe-
nomena involve economic value. Thus, witnessing a superstar (team or athlete) 
dominating a sport may be exciting for consumers 3 , at least under yet-to-be-
3 Without the imbalance-creating successes of stars like Boris Becker, Michael Schumacher or Tiger 
Woods, their respective sports would hardly have experienced such an upward swing of sports 
4 
 
                                                          
 
 
specified circumstances. So far, the economics of superstars have not yet been sys-
tematically integrated into the economic modeling of sports (but see Buraimo & 
Simmons 2013). However, it seems unlikely that perfect competitive balance, effec-
tively a random walk without any famous competitors, would serve to create an 
attractive sports product.4 It is certainly not accidental that fandom typically con-
centrates on a few famous competitors in each league or championship, preferably 
on those with a particularly (imbalanced) high probability of winning. Further con-
siderations along these lines refer to the particular excitement of upsets, i.e. if the 
underdog beats the favorite, which also require some minimum imbalance (Coates, 
Humphreys & Zhou 2014), or to the particular preference of fans attending a match 
in the stadium to see their favourite home team winning by a clear margin (e.g. 
Forrest et al. 2005; Coates & Humphreys 2010, 2012). 
In summary, there are good reasons why some competitive balance contributes to 
consumer welfare but there are also good reasons why some competitive imbal-
ance contributes to consumer welfare. If there is an optimal competitive balance, it 
still needs to be determined in an empirically and politically meaningful way. In the 
words of Zimbalist (2002: 111): “Competitive balance is like wealth. Everyone 
agrees it is a good thing to have, but no one knows how much one needs.” 
2.2 Policy Relevance 
The notion that more competitive balance always improves (consumer) welfare has 
been vital to several types of widespread sports policy implications. In order to un-
derstand the peculiar policy problems in professional sports, a look at the typical 
organization of professional sports is necessary. In contrast to most ‘ordinary’ mar-
kets, professional sports is characterized by market-internal institutions that are 
established, implemented and enforced by powerful market-internal organizations 
(the sports associations). The existence of these sports associations is essential for 
the business of professional sports because any kind of sports needs rules for the 
sporting competition that must be defined, implemented and enforced. Coopera-
tion on rules among the participants is elementary for the common product to be 
produced and, in Europe, most sports associations were historically created as syn-
dicates of the sports participants (e.g. the clubs).5 However and somewhat inevita-
consumer interest. However, this does not negate the possibility that continuing dominance be-
yond some yet-to-be defined point may significantly decrease spectators’ value and interest. 
4 The utility that parts of the sports audience gain from betting would also decrease if odds were all 
the same (perfect CB). 
5 Taking European football as an example, the clubs are organized in regional and national football 
associations (like the Deutscher Fußball Bund, DFB, for instance) which are member associations 
consisting of the clubs or the regional associations. The continental competitions are organized 
under the competence of the European football association (UEFA), which is a member associa-
tion consisting of the national football associations as members. All these associations are private 
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bly, these sports associations enjoy a lot of power – not only over the sports side 
but also over the business side. Typical tasks and competences of sports associa-
tions include, inter alia, 
- setting the rules of the game, 
- limiting and controlling entry, 
- marketing the common product (inter alia, bundling and selling broadcast-
ing rights), and 
- sharing, distributing and re-allocating revenues. 
From this list alone (which does not intend to be a complete one), the mixture of 
sporting and business tasks that sports associations engage in becomes visible. It is 
virtually impossible to disentangle ‘purely sporting’ activities from ‘business rele-
vant’ activities. For instance, rule-setting includes the definition of the number of 
players in team sports or the length and width of the playing field as well as regu-
lations like gate-revenue sharing, salary caps or transfer payment regulations. Fur-
thermore, even apparently purely sporting rules like the modified definition of the 
physical characteristics of the competition ball for the FIFA Football World Champi-
onship in South Africa may be motivated by commercial considerations, for in-
stance, increasing the probability and frequency of goals.  
Consequently, sports associations as the market-internal regulators must be viewed 
to be important economic players – even though they usually prefer to see them-
selves as non-business entities just working ‘for the good of society’. From an eco-
nomic perspective, internal market institutions and organizations are usually as-
sessed according to their market power and the incentives that shape their behav-
iour. With respect to market power, governing associations of professional sports 
usually constitute regional monopolies. In most professional sports, there is no 
competition among market-internal regulatory agencies and there is no competi-
tion among leagues or championships within a given jurisdiction, either. For in-
stance, there is only one European football association (UEFA), only one in Germany 
(DFB), etc., and there is only one UEFA Champions League, one Bundesliga, etc. This 
monopolistic pyramid structure of professional sports market-internal organizations 
may indeed be more beneficial than competing championships and associations, 
however, it does generate a position of dominance. Furthermore, these monopolis-
tic associations experience incentives to maximize the revenues and/or profits from 
marketing the professional sport under their governance. As such, their market 
power is not without economic concern. 
Within this setting, the competitive balance problem plays an important role for 
market-internal as well as external regulation. The idea that preserving competitive 
companies, in some sports and in some countries organized as ‘non-for-profit clubs’, in other 
cases as ‘ordinary’ companies. 
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balance is beneficial and/or even necessary for the economic success represents a 
primary justification for sports associations to regulate business-relevant parts of 
the sport. Quite frequently, these interventions to promote competitive balance 
include the implementation of rules and policies that generate/maximize revenues 
in a non-competitive way, for instance, by 
- artificially (over-)limiting entry, for instance, in the FIA Formula One World 
Championship,  
- discriminatory controlling entry, for instance, the ‘50plus rule’ in German 
football excluding new commercial investors from club ownership but pre-
serving incumbent commercial investments (Budzinski & Müller 2013: 278-
283) or in U.S. professional sports leagues, 
- outright price cartels, for instance, centralized marketing of broadcasting 
rights (Budzinski 2012: 52-53, 58-62), 
- governing the budgetary behavior of competitors, for instance, (ticket) reve-
nue-sharing arrangements (like in the NFL or the MLB), salary and payroll 
caps (like NFL, NBA, NHL), direct or indirect budget caps (including the re-
cent UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations6), draft systems for new player re-
cruitment (like in the NFL or the MLB), etc., 
- implementing internal labour market rules restricting the contractual free-
dom of the parties (e.g. transfer periods and regulations or restrictions of 
consulting activities by independent managers), and   
- concluding exclusivity contracts with equipment suppliers. 
Many of these market-internal policies and regulations cause questionable competi-
tion effects and include adverse effects on customers and other related business 
players. However, they are usually brought forward by highlighting the preserva-
tion or improvement of competitive balance as one of the major reasons – a reason 
that qualifies to overcompensate the adverse effects. 
The market-internal policies and regulations by the sports associations correspond 
to public policy – or, more precisely, to a relinquishment of public authorities to 
intervene with the sports self-regulation. Furthermore, some public policies provide 
exemptions or special policies when it comes to professional sports with competi-
tive balance considerations often playing an indirect or direct justification role. 
Prominent examples include competition policy, investment policy or labour market 
policy who frequently accommodate restrictive practices by sports associations be-
cause of the competitive balance-enhancing effects of these restrictive practices.7 
6 See, inter alia, Budzinski & Müller (2013), Budzinski (2014), Budzinski & Szymanski (2014), Franck 
(2014), Hamil (2014), Könecke & Schubert (2014), Maxcy (2014), Peeters & Szymanski (2014), 
Preuss, Haugen & Schubert (2014), and Szymanski (2014). 
7 See for recent discussion regarding U.S. antitrust policy Ross (2003), Kahn (2009) and Zimbalist 
(2009) and regarding European competition policy Budzinski (2012). 
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2.3 The Empirical Record 
The overwhelming popularity of the UOH and competitive balance in sports eco-
nomics led to a massive literature looking for empirical evidence. In doing so, three 
dimensions of competitive balance are usually distinguished (Cairns, Jennett & 
Sloane 1986): 
- short-term outcome uncertainty, referring to a specified match or single 
event, 
- mid-term outcome uncertainty 8 , referring to in-season sub-competitions 
such as the race for the championship, the battle against relegation, or the 
qualifying race for continental competitions (UEFA Europa League; UEFA 
Champions League), and 
- long-term outcome uncertainty, referring to the domination (or lack thereof) 
of a league or championship by single or few teams over a period of time. 
In line with the research discussed in the following sections of this paper, we focus 
on empirical studies of European professional football. Here, decades of empirical 
research within sports economics have not been successful in establishing clear evi-
dence for the importance of short-term and long-term outcome uncertainty for 
stadium attendance or TV audience.9 Most of the studies analyzing the potential 
impact of short-term outcome uncertainty on stadium attendance predominantly 
found either no significant effect (e.g. Hart, Hutton & Sharot 1975; Szymanski 
2001; Forrest & Simmons 2002, 2006; Benz, Brandes & Franck 2009) or an effect 
not supporting the UOH (e.g. Peel & Thomas 1992; Czarnitzki & Stadtmann 2002; 
Feddersen et al. 2006; Buraimo & Simmons 2008, 2013; Pawlowski & Anders 2012). 
Although there are fewer empirical studies explicitly examining the impact of long-
term outcome uncertainty on stadium attendance or TV viewership, the available 
(partly anecdotal) evidence contradicts the UOH since a slightly increasing imbal-
ance has been accompanied by increasing attendance figures (Flores, Forrest & 
Tena 2010; Pawlowski, Breuer & Hovemann 2010; DFL 2014).  
With respect to mid-term outcome uncertainty, however, the picture is less con-
sistent. While a significant positive effect was often detected if a team still had a 
chance to contend for the championship (Jennett 1984; Pawlowski & Anders 2012; 
Scelles et al. 2013) or to earn promotion (Forrest & Simmons 2002; Scelles et al. 
2013), neither the chance to avoid relegation (Jennett 1984) nor to qualify for the 
UEFA Champions League (Pawlowski & Anders 2012) was found to be of any ap-
parent importance to consumers. A recent analysis of television audience demand 
for English premier league football finds no significant effect of mid-term outcome 
uncertainty; instead, it is the star quality of a team that drives television audience 
8 Scelles et al. (2013) refer to mid-term outcome uncertainty as competitive intensity. 
9 For a detailed analysis of the literature see Pawlowski (2013a; 2013b). 
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(Buraimo & Simmons 2013). Moreover, looking at longer-run developments, the 
authors find a tendency away from competitive balance and towards star effects in 
terms of determinants of television audience demand. 
In summary, according to existing economics-related studies “…match attendance 
[in English professional league soccer] appears unrelated to competitive balance…” 
(Szymanski 2001) as the studies display "a lack of certainty about outcome uncer-
tainty" in professional football (Leach 2006: 117), rather suggesting a rejection of 
the UOH. However, we think it might be somewhat premature to jump to the con-
clusion that competitive balance and outcome uncertainty do not matter for con-
sumers. Instead, the underwhelming empirical record may be related to associating 
competitive balance and outcome uncertainty to rather global statistical measures 
which may just not mirror how consumers perceive suspense in a league or a 
championship. The significance of some mid-term indicators (championship race, 
promotion/relegation battle) may be viewed as supporting this view that is in line 
with the statement: “the best measure of competitive balance is the one to which 
fans show the greatest sensitivity” (Zimbalist 2002: 112). Consequently, another 
line of analyzing the UOH may involve measuring the perception of competitive 
balance through the eyes of the fans (Pawlowski 2013a; b; Pawlowski & Budzinski 
2013, 2014). Therefore, we first look into some concepts from behavioral econom-
ics (sections 3.1-3.3) and subsequently discuss some preliminary empirical evidence 
from our research (section 3.4). 
3. Behavioural Explanations of Fan Perception of Competitive Balance10 
3.1 The Behavioural Perspective 
If fans followed the model of the perfectly-rational homo oeconomicus, then there 
should be no difference between statistically measured CB in European football 
leagues and perceived CB in the eyes of the fans. However, to better understand 
possible effects of perception that deviate from statistically measured effects, we 
need to move away from simplistic notions of perfect information, perfectly ration-
al behaviour and textbook-level microeconomics.  
During the past five decades, economic research has contributed to enrich our un-
derstanding of economic behaviour by introducing branches like behavioural eco-
nomics, institutional economics and experimental economics into the mainstream 
of economic thinking. Altogether, they draw an empirically well-supported image 
of the rational-behaving economic subject that includes imperfect information, 
subjective and constructive perception as well as rule-following, heuristic behav-
iour. Cognitive resources are scarce and, consequently, individuals economize on 
10 This chapter closely mirrors Pawlowski & Budzinski (2014). 
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these resources, which includes limiting information gathering (Simon 1955; Stigler 
1961), economizing on the interpretative force of the brain by relying on mental 
models (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Denzau & North 1994; Kahneman 2003a, 
2003b) as well as focusing their scarce cognitive resources on those problems 
where their employment promises to yield extraordinary revenues and reverting to 
heuristics-following behaviour in ordinary situations (Budzinski 2003; Vanberg 
2004).  
This is a world where perception matters and plays a considerable role. Rational 
behaviour, then, does not so much describe ‘right’ behaviour in terms of statistical 
facts, but instead – less ambitiously – the consistency of mind and action. Drawing 
broadly on a body of economic thought that is enriched by these influences, three 
possible explanations of the (non-)divergence of objective competitive balance 
(OCB) and perceived competitive balance (PCB) can be derived: framing effects 
(3.1), threshold effects (3.2), and attention level effects (3.3). These effects are dis-
cussed in the following. 
3.2 Framing Effects 
Framing effects imply that the context of a perception or a decision situation mat-
ters for interpretation and action: individuals are framed by past experiences as 
well as the environment of a situation and this influences how they perceive and 
interpret a given phenomenon. With respect to CB this means that fans are not in-
fluenced by a given CB-value in an isolated way. Instead, that CB-value is perceived 
in the context of the previous CB-values, which represent the framing of the fans 
and act as reference points for the individual, subjective valuation. As a conse-
quence, changes in CB-values become more important than cardinal levels. If CB 
has been very low in a given league, then any improvement from that low level 
may be perceived as “high” CB because fans have been accustomed to low CB-
levels and take the past imbalance as a reference point (anchoring effects). On the 
other hand, if CB-levels are high, a small deterioration of CB may already be per-
ceived as “low” CB because fans have adjusted their reference point to the high 
level. The subjective assessment of CB is then driven by a mismatch of CB-
expectation and actual CB: if CB is higher than expected, PCB will likely exceed OCB, 
whereas it will fall short of OCB if CB is lower than expected.11 As a consequence, it 
may happen that OCBLEAGUE_A > OCBLEAGUE_B  ˄  PCBLEAGUE_A < PCBLEAGUE_B.12 
11 In addition to past expressions of CB, expectations can be driven by other influences. For instance, 
CB-expectation could be extraordinary high because of welcomed rule changes or an extraordi-
nary influx of prominent (star) players (allocated to many teams), etc. 
12 Coates, Humphreys and Zhou (2014) employ a somewhat similar thought on a match level when 
they model individual consumer choice as depending on a utility function that, inter alia, in-
cludes the difference between the actual match outcome and the expected match outcome as a 
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Consider the following hypothetical example: country A, on the one hand, has a 
comparably imbalanced premier-level league say with CBR-levels oscillating around 
values of 0.3. Country B’s fans, on the other hand, enjoy a premier-level league 
with CBR-levels around values of 0.7. Now, in the recent seasons, CBR of League A 
unexpectedly jumps to 0.45 whereas CBR level of League B unexpectedly drops to 
0.55. While League B remains the more balanced one in OCB terms, framing effects 
may well drive PCB of (disappointed) League B-fans below the PCB of (positively 
surprised) League A-fans. 
In order to gather some empirical evidence on competitive balance as it is perceived 
through the eyes of the fans (PCB), we conducted a written survey amongst foot-
ball fans in three European countries (Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands). 
The major leagues in these countries differ in regard to size, UEFA ranking position 
and, naturally, also in terms of OCB. The survey took place before/during 14 match-
es in the first divisions of the respective leagues both in the stadium as well as in 
bars where football matches were broadcasted live. The complete data base con-
tains n = 1,689 observations (with nGermany = 1,203; nDenmark = 267, nNetherlands = 
219).13 
Indeed, in our study, we find some support for framing effects (Pawlowski & 
Budzinski 2013). The decrease in OCB seems to influence perceptions in a stronger 
way than the level of OCB in the case of the Danish league. Note that the Danish 
league actually is characterized by a better OCB-value than the premier-level 
leagues in the Netherlands and in Germany in the first two periods and still better 
than the Dutch league in the third period (see fig. 1). Yet, the decrease of CB is 
much more dramatic in Denmark than in the other two leagues. From the first to 
third period, CBR for Denmark decreased by around 34 per cent (from 0.8 to 0.53), 
whereas for Germany it decreased ‘only’ by around 12 per cent (from 0.66 to 0.58) 
and the Dutch level increased by around 14 per cent (from 0.36 to 0.42). This cor-
responds to the PCB that shows higher perceived imbalance for the Danish league 
compared to the other two. So, generalizing over the three periods, we can – a bit 
simplifying – see that while for OCB levels OCBDenmark > OCBGermany > OCBNetherlands 
holds, PCB-levels are characterized by PCBDenmark < PCBNetherlands < PCBGermany. 
Thus, the difference between OCB- and PCB-levels may be explained by changes of 
CB (as a framing factor) being a stronger influence on fans’ perception than CB-
levels.  
 
(positive or negative) utility source (surprise win by the supported team and surprise loss by the 
supported team respectively). 
13 For more detailed descriptions of the survey and the methods of analysis see Pawlowski (2013a, 
2013b) and Pawlowski & Budzinski (2013, 2014). 
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Fig. 1: Trends in Competitive Balance in the Danish Superligaen (DSL), the Dutch 
Eredivisie (DED) and the German Bundesliga (GBL) (Pawlowski & Budzinski 
2014) 
 
Note: A higher competitive balance ratio implies a more balanced league (Hum-
phreys 2002). 
 
Fig. 2: Perceived Level of Excitement and Willingness-to-pay to Increase the Cur-
rent Level of Excitement in the Danish Superligaen (DSL), the Dutch Eredi-
visie (DED) and the German Bundesliga (GBL) (Pawlowski 2013a; Pawlowski 
& Budzinski 2013) 
 
 
3.3 Threshold Effects 
Threshold effects correspond to an important behavioural economics-qualification 
of the concept of optimality: instead of aspiring to an optimal level of satisfaction 
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in regard to the consumption of any good, individuals are typically less ambitious 
and settle for a “satisficing” level. Once a certain level of satisfaction is reached, no 
further cognitive resources are spent on optimizing the consumption in question. 
Instead, the scarce cognitive resources are focused on consumption areas where no 
satisfying level has been reached, yet. In other words, (small) variations above the 
satisficing level do not matter. However, if the “satisficing” threshold is undercut, 
then a strong (demand) reaction is triggered (discontinuity effect). 
While the empirical evidence for such effects differs among different types of wants 
and needs as well as among corresponding goods categories, fans’ desideratum for 
balanced competition within the league may provide a fitting example. So far, 
sports economics research has struggled to identify any optimal level of CB; identi-
fication of optimum has neither theoretically, nor empirically been managed (see 
section 2.1.). It appears to be broadly accepted that this, inter alia, has to do with 
conflicting influences such as the attractiveness of close competition in terms of 
high uncertainty of outcome and unpredictability of results versus the attractive-
ness of superstar players and superstar teams that inevitably generate some mini-
mum imbalance. Perfect CB would basically imply a random walk (without any fa-
vourites or underdogs) and most sports economists will agree that this is not opti-
mal. An additional factor in question may well be that fans are not interested in 
any optimal CB, i.e. they do not have an (explicit or implicit) notion of an optimum 
regarding CB themselves. Instead, fans may rather be interested in a satisficing CB. 
In this case, a discontinuity effect emerges: CB changes above the satisficing level 
of CB are not perceived to be relevant for consumption behaviour whereas a drop 
of CB below the satisficing level may cause discontinuous, perhaps even extreme 
consumption reactions. 
Again, we find preliminary supportive evidence that the relation between CB and 
fans’ consumption includes a discontinuity in terms of some kind of a “tipping 
point” or threshold above which changes in CB are not very relevant for fans 
whereas fans’ consumption behavior does change significantly once CB falls below 
that crucial threshold. While Pawlowski (2013a; 2013b) find that the PCB condi-
tional demand curves are s-shaped (indicating an area of inelastic response for 
both, very high and very low values of PCB), findings by Pawlowski and Budzinski 
(2013) suggest that changes in the fans’ willingness-to-pay for improvements of CB 
are triggered by CB falling below a crucial threshold, i.e. WTP ‘jumps’ to a higher 
level as a reaction to this. 
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 Fig. 3: Willingness-to-pay (per stadium ticket per game) to Increase the Current 
Level of PCB (Pawlowski & Budzinski 2013: 120) 
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3.4 Attention Level Effects 
In addition to the theoretical effects and their preliminary supportive evidence dis-
cussed above, a third effect might be relevant in this context as valuations of indi-
viduals depend on the degree of (their) attention that is drawn to a specific phe-
nomenon. This attention level depends – next to the individual’s preferences – on 
salience-related aspects like media intensity (presence in broadcasting, newspapers, 
internet, boulevard media, etc.) and relative importance of specific subparts of the 
overall phenomenon. In regard to the valuation of goods, a typical consequence is 
that valuations of those products that receive high attention levels outshine those 
of products with low attention levels in the perception of the consumer. 
With respect to the competitive balance of premier-level football leagues, the ef-
fects of diverging attention levels may be particularly relevant since the relative im-
portance of competition among teams differs significantly depending on the posi-
tions within the league’s ranking that these teams are fighting for. Put drastically, 
competition for top positions is considerably more important than competition in 
the ‘dull’ midfield: while the close duel of two teams for championship fame will be 
associated with high attention levels, a close fight of three teams for position 10 in 
an 18- or 20-teams league will certainly receive significantly lower attention levels. 
The relative importance of the championship race is obviously higher than of the 
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race for a midfield position14 and, correspondingly, media intensity (regarding all 
dimensions) will be much higher for the former than for the latter.  
However, the diverging attention levels can have an important influence on the 
perception of the competitive balance of the league. Consider the following two 
scenarios for an 18-teams league: A) the championship race between three teams is 
close until the last minute of the season; the three top teams are very evenly 
matched in terms of performance levels. However, the “race for position 10” is ear-
ly decided because the differences in competitiveness are rather high among the 
midfield teams; B) The championship race is decided very early in the season due to 
the clear dominance of one team that is head and toes above the competition. 
However, the “race for position 10” is very intense among four teams that are very 
evenly matched. 
It should not be surprising if the PCB of scenario A was significantly and considera-
bly higher than the PCB of scenario B. However, the standard OCB measures, meas-
uring the CB of the overall league, will not necessarily come to the same result be-
cause they do not distinguish between a close fight for position 1 and a close 
“fight for position 10”. So, while statistically (OCB) every sub-competition within 
the league is associated with the same value, the fans (PCB) will value some sub-
competitions higher than others – due to diverging attention levels. Differences 
between OCB and PCB may be rooted in the phenomenon that CB between (few) 
top teams may be more important for fan perception than the balance of the 
league in total. 
Looking at typical European soccer premier-level leagues, we can indentify several 
sub-competitions that exceed the ‘ordinary’ fight for positions in the league rank-
ing in terms of relative importance and media intensity. These include, for instance, 
the championship race, the race for the qualification positions for the European-
level competitions (UEFA Champions League; UEFA Europe League), the race 
against relegation15, and qualification positions for play-off rounds (depending on 
the league’s championship structure). 
14 Please note, that competition for midfield positions is relevant in some leagues (e.g. the German 
Bundesliga) because media revenues are (partly) redistributed based on the past season(s) posi-
tioning in the final league table(s). Therefore, different (midfield) positions go along with (slight-
ly) different amounts of club-specific media revenues. However, without any doubt, competition 
for the top positions is considerably more important for (most of the) fans. Recent sports eco-
nomics research provides evidence that the same is true for the participants of the league: effort 
levels for comparably less important midfield position races are lower than such for more im-
portant decisions like the race for the championship (Feddersen, Humphreys & Soebbing 2012). 
15 European football leagues are typically open leagues in which the teams on the last positions in 
the ranking are relegated to a lower-level league and replaced by the top performers of these 
power level leagues. 
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The consequent hypothesis is that PCB is more driven by the closeness of these 
comparatively important sub-competitions (i.e. by the CB among the contenders 
for the relevant positions in the league ranking) than by the CB of the overall 
league that typically determines the standard OCB measures. If this hypothesis can 
be supported, then the gap between PCB and OCB will disappear when OCB 
measures are employed that do not target the league as a whole but focus on the 
relevant sub-competitions (i.e. mid-term components of league competition).  
In addition to the overall index of PCB generated by the survey analysis (see section 
3.2. and Fig. 2), the survey consisted of 11 items reflecting the short-, mid- and 
long-term outcome uncertainty. They were evaluated by the respondents on a 4-
point scale (1 ≡ I do not agree … 4 ≡ I agree completely) with the following type of 
question:  
Thinking back to previous seasons, what is your opinion of the LEAGUE with 
regard to…?. 
Fig. 4 summarizes the mean values for the four items reflecting mid-term outcome 
uncertainty. In line with the findings for the overall index of PCB, the Danish Super-
ligaen is perceived to be significantly less balanced also with regard to mid-term 
outcome uncertainty. Specifically, the race for the championship appears to be less 
balanced as most of the Danish Fans disagree with the statement that the fight for 
the title remains exciting for a long time within a season. These perceptions by the 
fans are confirmed by the available ‘objective’ data. Five years prior to the inquires 
(season 2006/07-2010/11) there have been four different champions in the German 
Bundesliga and the Dutch Eredivisie each while FC Copenhagen won all but one 
championship in Denmark. Furthermore, the “championship relevance” of games 
further strengthens this result. A game possesses championship relevance if at least 
one of two teams still has a (mathematical) chance of winning the championship. 
Significantly, in the season before the inquiry took place (2010/11) only 45% of the 
games in Denmark had such championship relevance in contrast to more than 60% 
of the games in Germany and the Netherlands.  
 
Fig. 4: Fans’ Evaluation of Different Dimensions of Excitement in the Danish Super-
ligaen (DSL), the Dutch Eredivisie (DED) and the German Bundesliga (GBL) 
(Pawlowski 2013a; Pawlowski & Budzinski 2014). 
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Fig. 5 provides some descriptive evidence based on the average winning margin in 
three different leagues. While the champions in the Dutch Eredivisie and the Ger-
man Bundesliga are on average 3.4 respectively 5.2 points ahead, the champions in 
the Danish Superligaen are on average 12.4 points ahead of the team in second 
place. In 2010/11, FC Copenhagen was even 26 points ahead of the runner-up 
Odense BK. 
In summary, the stronger imbalance of the Danish league can be found both in 
perceived and objective measures if mid-term measures are analyzed. For instance, 
mid-term PCB and mid-term OCB measures both reflect the comparatively strong 
imbalance of the Danish league when it comes to analysing championship rele-
vance. While the ranking of the Dutch and the German league, which are rather 
close to each other, is not unambiguous, still the objective and subjective measures 
show exactly the same pattern, i.e. OCBDenmark < OCBGermany, Netherlands and PCBDenmark < 
PCBGermany, Netherlands. This supports our hypothesis that PCB is more driven by the 
closeness of comparatively important sub-competitions (i.e. by the CB among the 
contenders for the relevant positions in the league ranking) than by the CB of the 
overall league: the imbalance of the championship race in Denmark dominates the 
balance of the overall league in regard to the assessment and behaviour of the 
fans. 
 
Fig. 5: Average Number of Points ahead in the Danish Superligaen, the Dutch Ere-
divisie and the German Bundesliga (Pawlowski & Budzinski 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Implications for Sports Policy and Championship Management 
4.1 Does Competitive Balance Matter for Sports Policy? 
As has been outlined in section 2.2., the preservation and improvement of competi-
tive balance frequently serves as a justification for policy interventions and market 
regulations – exercised by sports associations and condoned by public authorities – 
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that otherwise raise considerable competition concerns. However, the standard 
theory of competitive balance (summarized in section 2.1.) – as convincing as it 
appears to be – severely lacks empirical support. It does so to an extent that doubts 
on the relevance of the ‘competitive balance defense’ may plausibly be raised. Add-
ing a behavioural view on competitive balance, thus, firstly delivers somewhat good 
news for balance-enhancing policies: competitive balance matters! However, it is 
perceived competitive balance that matters and it entails several peculiarities that 
matter for policy conclusions, namely 
- changes in competitive balance are more relevant than levels of competitive 
balance (section 3.1.), 
- the perceived imbalance needs to exceed certain thresholds in order to be-
come relevant for consumption behavior (section 3.2.), and 
- measures of mid-term competitive balance better reflect perceived competi-
tive balance than more global indicators, i.e. consumers attention focuses on 
important sub-competitions and not so much on overall-league suspense 
(section 3.3.).16 
The combination of the first and the second result points at situations of unex-
pected drops of competitive balance levels below certain satisficing thresholds that 
would trigger discontinuous and severe decreases of demand because of descend-
ing fans’ marginal utility. These represent situations that must be of concern for 
championship management (by sports associations, league organizations or pro-
moting companies). Here, the goal of protecting and stabilizing revenues would 
require CB-preserving or -improving interventions. If effective, such interventions 
would probably not be problematic from a social point of view because they im-
prove the product in the eyes of the fans, thus any revenue increase would come 
from an increased willingness-to-pay (driven by increasing marginal consumption 
utility). However, in contrast to the implications of the standard theory and in con-
trast to common sport policy practice, the validity of the competitive balance de-
fence for restrictive practices and policies is not ubiquitous. It requires rather spe-
cial situations for trends in competitive balance to actually trigger demand chang-
es. Both the first and second result in the bullet point list above clearly indicate that 
usually marginal changes in CB will not lead to an according change of fans’ con-
sumption behaviour17 – in line with the empirical record of decades of research (see 
16 These insights point to relevant implications for sports economics research, in particular, to the 
need for better develop and employ mid-term competitive balance measures (Fort & Maxcy 2003; 
Pawlowski & Budzinski 2014) as well as to consider economic models of leagues or other con-
tests that incorporate sub-competitions (implying a departure from two-team models). 
17 If the competition in question was not significantly imbalanced, (comparatively) small changes in 
competitive balance are unlikely to cause significant consumption reactions because the devel-
opment of competitive balance remains within a corridor below the critical threshold of too 
much imbalance perception. Only a major departure from historical competitive balance levels 
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section 2.3). As long as CB changes are not significant and unexpected (first result) 
and as long as CB changes remain within a satisficing level, they are not likely to 
significantly influence fans. Consequently, in such situations, restrictive interven-
tions would only be that: restrictive and anticompetitive without providing a better 
product to the fans. Note that such interventions may still be interesting from a 
championship management perspective because they may still lead to higher reve-
nues. However, it is the abuse of market power that yields these higher revenues 
(at the expense of fans welfare) and not an increasing utility on the side of the fans 
(as in the special case at the beginning of this paragraph). 
Consequently, from an economic perspective, restrictive interventions into competi-
tion by sports associations should only be allowed if they fulfil a set of rather re-
strictive criteria: 
(i) competitive imbalance is massive and/or OCB-indices have deteriorated 
significantly and unexpectedly/in an unanticipated way. 
(ii) intervention is capable of improving CB significantly (and not merely 
marginally). 
(iii) there is no less restrictive and less anticompetitive regulation that would 
be capable of creating comparable CB-improvements. 
(iv) generally, interventions with stronger restrictive effects require stronger 
evidence that (a) a situation is actually harming consumers and (b) ap-
plied instruments improve CB more and more secure. 
Even without expanding on specific regulations or interventions, it appears to be 
quite obvious that the competitive balance defence would not apply for many cur-
rent practices of sport associations that display questionable competitive effects. If 
market-internal policies and regulations entail non-negligible restrictive effects (like 
rights bundling and price cartels, limitations of competitive investment (budget 
caps of any type), restrictive and non-performance based entry regulations, exclu-
sivity equipment contracts, etc.), scepticism towards whether competitive balance 
effects of these policies and regulations are likely to offset the restrictive effects is 
justified. From an economic point of view, it requires reliable evidence of the bene-
fits of the probable competitive balance effects of restrictive practices as well as 
reliable evidence that this CB-change would actually influence PCB before they can 
be considered as remedying the negative effects. The burden of evidence should 
fall on the shoulders of the sports associations since (in the case of commercial and 
professional sports) they enjoy a considerable market power position (see section 
2.2) – and thus incentives for championship management are high to reap the rents 
from abusing this market power. 
towards more imbalance (major amounts of change) is likely to influence the perceived competi-
tive balance. 
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4.2 Narrow Oligopolies Fighting for the Championship Instead of Overall Bal
 ance? 
The more radical conclusion stems from the insight that it is the competition for 
important decisions (like the championship race or the battle against relegation) 
that predominantly drives perceived competitive balance. The implication of the 
overarching importance of these sub-competitions imply that arguing in favour of 
total league balance is less convincing. Instead, improving overall league balance is 
less important than improving balance among the limited number of teams ‘in the 
hunt’ for important decisions (championship race, etc.). The behavioural view im-
plies that it would be enough to have a sufficient number of teams strong enough 
to provide a close fight for the championship (ideally not decided before the last 
match) and it does not matter if the rest of the teams falls significantly behind 
them. Quite in contrast, it could be particularly beneficial to have an oligopoly of 
title contenders and an oligopoly of teams battling relegation – and merely few 
teams in between. Such a league structure may very well promote perceived com-
petitive balance – and fan utility – more than an overall more balanced league.  
This line of thought raises the interesting question of how many teams such a ben-
eficial oligopoly of title contenders should consist of. According to standard com-
petition theory, a first thought may point towards rather wide oligopolies consist-
ing of evenly balanced contenders for each subcompetition in question (for the 
championship, against relegation, for promotion, etc.). However, it would be up to 
further research whether a championship battle among 6, 7 or 8 rather equally 
strong teams would really be superior to a fight among 3 or 4 teams, for instance. 
The latter might be sufficient for a satisficing level of perceived competitive bal-
ance. Moreover, additionally considering superstar effects à la Adler (1985) (con-
sumption capital accumulation, network effects, commonality effects) and brand 
effects (Pawlowski & Anders 2012) may actually point towards the superiority of a 
narrow oligopoly of predominantly the same teams gunning for the championship 
each season. In such a narrow oligopoly – in the extreme case a duopoly – fan utili-
ty from star and brand phenomena would be increasing compared to a wider oli-
gopoly. In that regard, the Spanish football league with its persistent duopoly of 
Real Madrid and CF Barcelona duelling for the championship may be more attrac-
tive for fans than the more (overall) balanced leagues of Denmark or France, which, 
however, frequently lack a close championship race. Note, however, that domi-
nance by a single team remains likely to be welfare-reducing in the course of time. 
As a consequence, a duopoly with a distinct competitive advantage over the rest of 
the championship may be a risky strategy from a championship management per-
spective because it may quickly transform into a single team dominating that 
league. 
20 
 
 
 
The potentially provocative and radical character of these conclusions becomes 
clear when considering the implications for re-allocation mechanisms or budget-
equalizing regulations like equal distribution of TV revenues, gate revenue-sharing, 
salary caps, reverse draft systems, etc. They all breathe the spirit of overall league 
competitive balance – but may actually be counterproductive to a good league 
product since they do not automatically also promote close subcompetitions or 
may actually go at the expense of those. If some degree of inequality is inevitable 
(which is theoretically sound if teams are heterogeneous), then attempts to 
strengthen the weakest ones at the expense of the strongest ones may just reduce 
the (oligopolistic) number of teams that are able to fight the leader team. Instead 
of aiming to reduce the gap between the first and the last, it may be more efficient 
to aim to reduce the gap between the first and the fourth or fifth – because the 
gap between the top teams and the weakest teams does not matter for consumer 
utility. If a league should be made more attractive for the fans, then it would be 
important to enable the second, third and fourth best teams to take the fight to 
the number one – and not to improve the situation of the twelfth best team. Giving 
up the thought of equality among all the participants – the famous level-playing 
field – represents a significant departure from traditions of fairness rhetoric and so 
on. However, if we talk about a commercial product, then it may be consumer wel-
fare enhancing to move away from ‘equality among all’ and towards ‘ensuring suf-
ficient contenders for close subcompetitions’. This certainly requires creative think-
ing about rules and regulations. However, it also presents strong support for less 
interference with competitive forces: the notion of a level-playing field loses some 
of its support by the economic theory of sports.  
5. Conclusion 
The notion that more competitive balance increases fan utility, therefore their will-
ingness-to-pay, and thus the revenues of commercial and professional sports events 
has since the pioneering works represented one of the core elements of sports eco-
nomics. As such, it has served sports associations and authorities as a justification 
for a wide variety of interventions into the inextricable network of sports and eco-
nomic competition. Among the more popular interventions, regulations that dis-
play (otherwise) restrictive and anticompetitive effects have always played an im-
portant role – justified by the competitive balance defense. However, empirical 
support for this theory has always been ambiguous and ambivalent at best. In ad-
dition to the lack of empirical confirmation, new theory developments have also 
started to cast doubt on the relevance of competitive balance for welfare in com-
mercial sports markets. 
In this paper, we contribute to this body of thought by providing a behavioural 
perspective on the role of competitive balance in commercial sports leagues, using 
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(European-style) football leagues as an example. From a theoretical perspective, we 
argue that perceived competitive balance should differ from statistically-measured 
‘objective’ competitive balance, for instance because of framing effects, satisficing 
and threshold effects as well as attention level effects. Based upon an international 
research project, we provide empirical support for the relevance of the behavioural 
view. While we find that perceived competitive balance matters for fan utility and 
demand behaviour, it does not do so in the maximizing sense of the standard theo-
ry: above a satisficing level of statistical competitive balance, fans do not perceive 
differences as relevant. However, if the CB-level falls under the satisficing threshold, 
discontinuous demand reactions must be expected. Furthermore, fans may perceive 
similar OCB-levels very differently depending on the framing by experience and ex-
pectations. Eventually, theory suggests and the empirical picture indicates that fans 
perception is not driven by overall competitive balance of the league in total as the 
standard theory – sometimes explicitly but also often implicitly – assumes. Instead, 
important subcompetitions like the race for the championship or the fight against 
relegation influence the perceived competitive balance significantly more than the 
total picture. 
The theoretical and empirical extension of sports economics thinking provides im-
portant conclusions for the assessment of interventions into commercial sports 
markets by sports associations or public authorities. While a competitive balance 
defense may actually be valid, it requires very specific situations and conditions to 
justify otherwise restrictive interventions and regulations by competitive balance 
improvements. Most common practices in this area, however, are unlikely to stand 
in line with behavioural economics thinking. We argue that competitive balance 
defenses against restrictive and anticompetitive regulations should only be ali-
mented by public authorities under restrictive conditions with considerable evi-
dence burden on the sports associations. Otherwise, the most typically market 
power positions of the associations set incentives to reap anticompetitive rents at 
the expense of fans and other parties under the smoke screen of competitive bal-
ance policies. 
The insight that balanced subcompetitions are considerably more relevant than to-
tal league balance may have far-reaching implications. Many standard regulations 
applied in most commercial sports target an improvement of total league balance, 
i.e. reducing the gap between the best (richest) and the worst (poorest) team. This 
is often associated with the notion of a level-playing field. Examples of such regula-
tions include revenue-sharing arrangements, salary caps, centralized marketing, 
reverse talent draft systems, and many more. However, the attempts to create 
more balance between the strongest and the weakest appears to be irrelevant to 
fan welfare at best and harmful at worst. A close race for the championship among 
few popular contenders and large differences to the lower parts of the ranking 
serves fan utility more than an overall very balanced league with a champion that is 
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crowned early in the season or than an overall balanced league were teams without 
contours, star effects and profile randomly take the honours. Further research is 
necessary to shed light on optimal sizes of oligopolies of subcompetition contend-
ers and regulations that promote this. However, it appears to be a case in favour of 
less intervention into the competitive forces in the first place. 
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